STALEMATE, the Grinding Machine & Imperialism continued

The Grinding machine of War is best captured in the opening salvo of the Chapter. The Irish Guards regiment (of which battle honours they can add Loos, the Somme, Cambrai & Arras) were 1000 strong when they departed with the BEF in 1914. However, the final death-toll rose to almost 2500 dead over the course of the war (2.5 x original battle strength). Over one week in the early skirmishes of 1914 (31^st October – 8^th November) they substituted 613 of their ranks for 100 yards of front line.

Despite the deadlock that fast set in on the Western Front, the politicians and soldiers on both sides failed to appreciate the changing face of warfare. The Germans, for one, were not immune to this. At Langemarck in October 1914, the Germans threw 90k men at the strong British & French defensive frontline. This led to the loss of almost 70% of the mainly inexperienced soldiers for no gains & became a German bloody nose, known colloquially as the “Kindermord” (Massacre of the Innocents). My father & I actually visited the graveyard in Belgium (near Ypres) last year (2014).

The second year of war also saw Allied expeditions in the Mediterranean & the Middle East fail to achieve any 19^th C style decisive victory that could alter the stalemate. Imperial Jingoism tethered to British arrogance led to a disastrous loss of manpower in Mesopotamia (Modern Iraq) & the beaches of Turkey that could have been perhaps better served on the Western Front.

An aside: Both sides failed to “change with the times” swiftly enough to achieve victory in WW I. On the other hand, the Germans learned lessons during the First World War by matching latest technology & Blitzkrieg tactics effectively in the Second World War to dominate much of Europe in the early-goings. This despite Tanks being first developed & used by Britain in WW I (Cambrai, 1917!).

One thing which stands out to me about the decision to fight in the Med & Middle East is that history repeats itself – i.e. Churchill was almost convinced in both World Wars that decisive victory could be achieved in secondary theatres. This proved to be a false pretence in both, i.e. stalemate was also achieved in Italy in WW II (memories of Monte Cassino). It is amazing how much Churchill’s strong personality allowed him to go down in history as one of the most beloved Britons. His “we will fight them on the beaches…” speech, standing up alone to the Nazis in Europe in 1940-41 was ridiculously brave & perhaps saved Europe from Total domination. However, this bravery could also transmuted into stupid decisions which eventually resulted in the deaths of countless British soldiers in both wars (Gallipoli 1915, Italian campaign 1943-45) without any real strategic victory in either campaign!

Something which adds a lot of credibility to the argument of “Stalemate” made by the author throughout the early chapters of the book is that the style of attritional warfare that was inevitable followed the war wherever it went.

I particularly enjoyed reading the succinct biography of General Foch, who outside of France is a secondary character in most Anglo-American history texts but is given a fair portrayal in this one. It is refreshing to hear about French commanders that were not cowardly or subordinate to their British Allies (not like a proud Frenchman ever would approve of that anyway!). The image of the moustachioed, cigar-smoking General, with quirky gestures & an eccentric nature is almost anathema to today’s measure of manliness, which is sad in a way. Foch was a calming influence & taught in his military schools the benefit of patience & agility when faced with changing conditions (to think!).

Lord Kitchener, the man behind the famous face on the famous poster imploring British men to join the ranks of their brethren is introduced in this chapter as well. Not many Americans may know that “Uncle Sam” was a reproduction of this Imperial call-to-arms. British Imperial hegemony around the world was of vital & first importance to Kitchener, as well as most of the British government. The build-up of British manpower & resources was to be of strategic significance, as in when the Belligerents finished beating themselves to a pulp, the British could consolidate their global interests with the most powerful & ready Army left. It is perhaps unsurprising that the French also held similar post-war Imperial visions. It is however surprising how historical enemies separated by a mere 33 km of water maintained a working relationship against the German juggernaut.

Reflecting on the war diplomacy of the period, particularly the Balkans; where possible gains could be had against the weak Austro-Hungarians, demonstrated that Western Europeans (particularly the British & French) had no clue of the complex interactions of ethnicities & history of this region. This led to incorrect policies & inadequate support of these people during the war years. I find it fascinating that the West still hasn’t fully grasped the nature of the region – manifested in NATO’s response to the horrible massacres perpetrated in the 1990s in Serbia, Croatia & Bosnia & the failure of the UN to conclude any meaningful peace during the worst years of conflict there.